by Domenico Vito
SB64 was expected to mark the transition from negotiation to implementation after the political outcomes of COP30 in Belém. Instead, Bonn revealed a climate regime caught between urgency and fragmentation. While Parties broadly agreed that the era of implementation has begun, they remained deeply divided on what implementation actually means and, above all, who should finance it. Finance emerged once again as the central fault line connecting adaptation, mitigation, just transition, transparency and climate action delivery. Developing countries insisted that implementation without means of implementation is merely rhetoric, while developed countries sought to contain finance discussions within existing mandates. The result was limited progress on key negotiating tracks, including the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP), and several transparency items. At the same time, political momentum shifted outside the formal negotiations toward implementation initiatives such as the Belém Mission 1.5, the Global Implementation Accelerator, the TAFF Roadmap, and the COP31 Action Agenda. SB64 therefore exposed a growing duality within the UNFCCC process: negotiations increasingly struggle to produce consensus, while implementation coalitions, roadmaps and voluntary initiatives become the main vehicles for climate action. Whether these two tracks can remain connected will largely determine the success of COP31 in Antalya
Overall Geopolitical Dynamics of SB64
The geopolitical landscape of SB64 reflected a world undergoing profound transformation. Three blocs became particularly visible:
- Developing Countries (G77+China, LMDCs, African Group, Arab Group, LDCs and AOSIS) increasingly converged around a common message: implementation cannot proceed without predictable finance, technology transfer and capacity-building. Adaptation finance, Article 9.1 obligations and access to climate finance became central political demands.
- Developed Countries (EU, UK, Canada, Norway, Japan and others) focused on operationalizing technical mechanisms and implementation frameworks while resisting attempts to reopen finance commitments in adaptation and mitigation discussions.
- Emerging powers, particularly Brazil, increasingly acted as political bridge-builders through the TAFF Roadmap, Forest Roadmap and Global Implementation Accelerator, while Australia and Türkiye began shaping the COP31 narrative around electrification and implementation.
A second geopolitical tension emerged around science itself. Several delegations and observers raised concerns over attempts to weaken references to IPCC findings and overshoot discussions, while vulnerable countries defended science as the foundation for collective ambition.
The result was a paradoxical conference: broad consensus that climate action must accelerate, but growing disagreement over governance, finance and burden-sharing.
Can there be an implementation era without a finance era?
For developing countries, the answer was clearly no.
For many developed countries, implementation meant improving governance, technical cooperation, transparency systems, carbon markets, planning instruments and investment frameworks.
For many developing countries, implementation meant something much more concrete:
“Where is the money?”
This tension defined almost every major negotiation track.
Week One: Optimism, Technical Work and the Rise of the Implementation Agenda
The first week opened with an unusually calm atmosphere. Compared with the procedural battles that characterized the closing hours of COP30 in Belém, SB64 began quietly and efficiently. The agenda was adopted rapidly, and delegates entered Bonn with a shared narrative around implementation, delivery and operationalization.
The political spotlight quickly shifted from negotiations to a series of new implementation initiatives launched by the Brazilian and incoming Turkish-Australian Presidencies:
- The Belém Mission 1.5
- The Global Implementation Accelerator (GIA)
- The Climate Implementation Bridge
- The TAFF Roadmap on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels
- The Forests Roadmap
- COP31’s Electrification Agenda (35 by 35)
For many observers, Bonn felt less like a traditional negotiating session and more like a laboratory for the post-COP30 climate architecture.
Yet beneath this optimism, fault lines were already visible.
The first signs emerged in discussions on:
- the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP);
- adaptation finance;
- climate finance governance;
- Article 9.1 obligations;
- future GST implementation.
Negotiators soon discovered that “implementation” meant very different things to different groups.
The Geopolitical Landscape: A New North-South Divide
Unlike previous years, SB64 was not characterized primarily by disputes over mitigation ambition.
The fundamental divide concerned implementation responsibility.
Developing countries repeatedly argued:
“We have plans. We have NDCs. We have adaptation plans. We know what to do. We simply lack the means to do it.”
Across adaptation rooms, finance discussions, transparency negotiations and GST dialogues, the same narrative emerged:
Implementation requires:
- finance;
- technology transfer;
- capacity building.
Without these elements, implementation becomes merely an unfunded mandate.
Developed countries largely acknowledged implementation challenges but emphasized:
- enabling environments;
- policy reforms;
- investment mobilization;
- institutional strengthening;
- private sector engagement.
The result was a widening gap between a “delivery” narrative and a “justice” narrative.
The Battle Over Finance
By the middle of Week One it became clear that finance would dominate SB64.
Almost every negotiation room eventually became a finance room.
The most contentious questions included:
Adaptation Finance
Developing countries demanded operationalization of the COP30 commitment to triple adaptation finance by 2035.
Developed countries resisted embedding finance language into adaptation negotiations, arguing these discussions belonged elsewhere.
Climate Finance Work Programme
The Climate Finance Work Programme emerged as perhaps the biggest future political battle heading into COP31.
Developing countries pushed for stronger discussions around Article 9.1 obligations.
Developed countries preferred focusing on broader finance mobilization discussions under Article 2.1(c).
Adaptation Fund
Even procedural discussions became politicized.
Debates over membership arrangements evolved into wider disagreements about governance and representation in the climate finance architecture.
Finance was no longer a standalone agenda item.
It became the lens through which every other issue was viewed.
Adaptation: The Main Casualty of Bonn
No issue better illustrates the difficulties of SB64 than the Global Goal on Adaptation.
At COP30 many observers expected adaptation to finally gain equal standing with mitigation.
Instead, adaptation negotiations became the most contentious discussions of the conference.
Three battles unfolded simultaneously:
1. The Technical Taskforce
Disagreement emerged over who should control the new Belém-Addis Vision Taskforce.
Options ranged from:
- expert-led structures (supported by EU and others);
- Party-led structures (supported by many developing countries);
- hybrid governance arrangements.
2. Adaptation Finance
Developing countries demanded references to:
- tripling adaptation finance;
- accountability;
- delivery commitments.
Developed countries opposed expanding finance discussions within GGA negotiations.
3. The Nature of the GGA Itself
A deeper question emerged:
Is the GGA merely a technical framework for indicators?
Or is it a political instrument for holding countries accountable?
No agreement emerged.
Ultimately the negotiations collapsed into Rule 16.
Perhaps the most symbolic moment of SB64.
Mitigation: The Ghost in the Room
Ironically, mitigation—the issue that originally created the UNFCCC—received less political energy than adaptation and finance.
The Mitigation Work Programme became trapped in procedural disputes.
Parties disagreed on:
- extending the programme beyond 2030;
- links with the Global Stocktake;
- future work modalities;
- whether the programme should provide policy guidance.
The deeper problem was political.
Several countries feared that stronger mitigation discussions could create new expectations before unresolved finance commitments were addressed.
As a result, mitigation discussions often appeared frozen between ambition and implementation.
The Shadow of Santa Marta
One of the most important political developments was not happening inside the negotiation rooms.
It was happening in the corridors.
The influence of the Santa Marta process was visible everywhere.
The TAFF Roadmap on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels became a recurring reference point.
For the first time since Dubai, countries and observers discussed transition away from fossil fuels not as a negotiated text but as an implementation challenge.
Questions included:
- How can countries build national fossil fuel transition roadmaps?
- How can developing countries access finance?
- What role should just transition play?
- How can implementation remain equitable?
Santa Marta shifted the conversation from “whether” to transition away from fossil fuels to “how.”
Science Under Pressure
Another striking feature of SB64 was the renewed contestation around science.
Several delegations expressed concern regarding attempts to weaken references to:
- IPCC findings;
- overshoot risks;
- the scientific basis for 1.5°C pathways.
At the same time, new scientific briefings highlighted a growing likelihood of temporarily overshooting 1.5°C.
The scientific message was clear:
The world is likely heading toward overshoot.
The political message was less clear:
How should the UNFCCC respond?
This tension between scientific urgency and political caution became increasingly visible throughout Week Two.
Week Two: Deadlocks and Procedural Battles
By the second week the optimistic implementation narrative had largely given way to procedural conflict.
Negotiation rooms became increasingly polarized.
Several agenda items had to be elevated to Heads of Delegation.
Delegates openly accused others of:
- blocking progress;
- renegotiating mandates;
- weakening agreed outcomes.
Adaptation, mitigation, transparency and finance all experienced significant delays.
The atmosphere increasingly resembled a pre-COP rather than an intersessional meeting.
The Emergence of COP31
While many negotiations struggled, one political story gradually emerged:
COP31 is beginning to take shape.
Türkiye and Australia presented the first elements of their vision:
The 35 by 35 Electrification Target
35% of final energy consumption supplied through electricity by 2035.
This quickly became one of the most visible implementation narratives emerging from Bonn.
The Climate Implementation Bridge
A mechanism designed to connect NDCs with implementation support and investment pipelines.
Access to Finance
Australia signaled a focus on improving finance access for LDCs and SIDS.
Together these initiatives suggest that Antalya may become:
the COP of implementation architecture rather than new negotiation mandates.
Focus 1: Belém Mission 1.5
The Belém Mission to 1.5 emerged as one of the most important political innovations connecting COP30 and COP31. Rather than creating new negotiated obligations, the initiative aims to identify barriers preventing countries from implementing NDCs and National Adaptation Plans and to generate practical pathways to keep the Paris Agreement temperature goal within reach.
Its significance lies in the recognition that overshooting 1.5°C is increasingly likely without accelerated implementation. Scientific briefings presented during SB64 emphasized that the world is approaching a critical threshold and that limiting both the magnitude and duration of overshoot must become the priority. Key pillars include:
- rapid electrification;
- accelerated renewable deployment;
- methane reductions;
- halting deforestation;
- carefully governed carbon dioxide removal.
Politically, the Belém Mission represents an attempt to transform the Global Stocktake outcomes into implementation pathways and could become a bridge between formal negotiations and real-world delivery. However, many Parties still seek greater clarity regarding governance, accountability and its relationship with the Global Implementation Accelerator.
Focus 2: Just Transition Mechanism (JTM)
The most significant institutional innovation emerging after COP30 is the development of a Just Transition Mechanism (JTM), operationalized through the new Belém-to-Antalya Mechanism (BAM).
The central political question is no longer whether a just transition is necessary, but how it will be implemented and financed.
Negotiations increasingly linked:
- fossil fuel transition;
- industrial transformation;
- social protection;
- Indigenous Peoples’ rights;
- workforce reskilling;
- equitable access to clean energy.
Particular attention has been given to Indigenous Peoples’ rights, Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), territorial governance and participation in transition planning. COP30 language explicitly recognized these dimensions, and stakeholders are now pushing for their operationalization through national frameworks and the new Just Transition Mechanism.
The broader geopolitical challenge remains unresolved: developing countries insist that a just transition requires substantial financial support, while developed countries focus on knowledge-sharing and technical cooperation. This debate will likely become one of the defining issues of COP31.
Focus 3: BAM (Belém-to-Antalya Mechanism)
The Belém-to-Antalya Mechanism (BAM) represents the first concrete effort to translate COP30’s Just Transition outcomes into a structured implementation process.
The mechanism is expected to:
- support international cooperation on just transition;
- facilitate technical assistance;
- promote capacity-building;
- share knowledge and best practices;
- strengthen implementation pathways before COP31.
Many observers view BAM as an important test of whether the UNFCCC can evolve from a negotiation-centric regime toward a more implementation-oriented architecture.
Its success will depend on three factors:
- meaningful participation of affected communities and Indigenous Peoples;
- integration with finance mechanisms;
- alignment with national NDCs and Long-Term Strategies.
BAM may ultimately become a prototype for future implementation mechanisms under the Paris Agreement.
Focus 4: Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA)
Adaptation became arguably the most contentious negotiation track of SB64.
The negotiations exposed a fundamental divide between developed and developing countries regarding:
- adaptation finance;
- governance of the Belém Adaptation Indicators;
- composition of the technical taskforce;
- relationship between technical and political processes.
Developing countries insisted on retaining references to the COP30 commitment to triple adaptation finance by 2035 and demanded stronger accountability mechanisms. Developed countries argued that finance discussions should occur in dedicated finance negotiations rather than within the GGA process.
The negotiations ultimately collapsed into Rule 16, meaning no agreement was reached and the issue was deferred to COP31. This outcome is widely regarded as one of the major failures of SB64.
The adaptation agenda now enters Antalya carrying significant political tensions and unresolved governance questions.
Focus 5: Article 6
Article 6 negotiations were among the few areas where incremental technical progress continued.
Discussions focused primarily on:
- financing infrastructure for Article 6.2 cooperative approaches;
- review systems;
- capacity-building;
- trust fund contributions;
- institutional arrangements supporting international carbon markets.
The key political challenge remains ensuring that Article 6 evolves from a rulebook into a functioning implementation tool capable of mobilizing investment and supporting higher ambition.
Several Parties emphasized the need to strengthen:
- transparency;
- environmental integrity;
- capacity-building for developing countries;
- accessibility of Article 6 mechanisms.
At the same time, Article 6 increasingly intersects with broader implementation discussions, including the Global Implementation Accelerator, NDC implementation and the emerging architecture around the COP30 roadmaps.
Unlike adaptation or finance, Article 6 was not at the center of major geopolitical confrontation in Bonn. However, it remains one of the most important operational instruments for translating climate ambition into measurable action.
Conclusion
SB64 will likely be remembered not for major negotiated outcomes, but for revealing the central dilemma of contemporary climate governance:
the world has largely agreed on where it wants to go, but remains deeply divided on how to get there, who pays, and how implementation should be governed.
The road to Antalya now revolves around five interconnected pillars:
- Delivering the Belém Mission 1.5;
- Operationalizing the Just Transition Mechanism and BAM;
- Resolving the adaptation finance deadlock under the GGA;
- Advancing Article 6 implementation;
- Defining a coherent vision of implementation that reconnects political ambition, finance and multilateral cooperation.
COP31 will therefore be less about negotiating new commitments and more about determining whether the Paris Agreement can successfully enter its long-promised implementation era.
