Domenico Vito & Vladislav Malashevskyy .

Osservatorio Parigi  – HubZine Italia

1. Introduction

Article 6 is often considered to be the financial arm of the Paris Agreement, and has been widely questioned from the start [1].

It contains several innovations especially with respect to the carbon markets that are gonna gradually substitute the CDM of Kyoto protocols.

Let’s start by saying that the implementation of the Paris Agreement and especially the adoption of  nationally determined contributions (NDCs) by the Parties would significantly reduce the so called ‘uncapped environment’, i.e. the emissions not covered by carbon regulation, which have so far been the main source of supply for voluntary carbon market activities. 

Second, the new agreement requires all Parties to raise their ambition when engaging in cooperation under Article 6, thereby terminating the era of ‘pure offsetting’[4].

Article 6 has the potential to reduce the total cost of implementing NDCs by more than half

(USD 250 billion per year in 2030), or facilitate the removal of 50% more emissions (around 5 GtCO2 per year in 2030), at no additional cost [1]  and furthermore it allows the collaboration among states towards mitigation action.

From a static perspective, the participation in an Article 6 cooperation may allow the host Party to target emissions that could not be tapped unilaterally [4]. 

Collectively Article 6 covers the approaches for mutual cooperation by the transferral of the so called  International Transferable Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs), by market mechanism and non market mechanism between host parties and acquiring parties . 

In particular this approach of Article 6 creates an effect by which 

• Market mechanisms are complementary measures that help achieve climate change mitigation targets at the lowest possible cost
• Market mechanisms incentivize entrepreneurship to develop mitigation actions and allow participating entities to internalize the cost of their emissions through carbon credits.
• Non Market mechanism also support and promote cooperation among the Parties

FIgure 1 resumes the basic sense of article 6.

In particular Article 6 delivers the necessary framework for avoiding double counting and requires comprehensive reporting of how countries engage in carbon markets, subject to international review [1]. 

An Article 6 cooperation will usually take place because emissions can be reduced at lower cost in the host Party than in the acquiring Party. 

These cost savings could in principle facilitate the adoption of more ambitious mitigation targets by the acquiring party in the future, by lowering political resistance and unlocking additional resources that can be devoted to climate action.
It should be noted, however, that lower costs do not automatically translate into an increase of mitigation ambition

From a dynamic perspective, the Article 6 cooperation may further put the host Party in a better position to strengthen its mitigation targets in the future [4]. 

Once the crediting period of the mitigation activity is terminated, the host Party could decide to unilaterally target the emissions that were previously addressed by the Article 6 cooperation and integrate these into its NDC to be able to adopt a stronger future NDC. 

2. Overall Structure of Article 6 and technical focuses

Article 6 can be considered to be the financial arm of the Paris Agreement.
It is the heart of the Paris Agreement, which we recall was created to “correct” the distortion of the Kyoto Protocol [1] which, in the face of the objective of reducing by 2.5% per year, resulted in a 50% increase in emissions in the first period of application.
The intention behind is to make countries and individuals cooperate at an international level, in a structured way and in such a way as to encourage and enhance action against climate change.

Article 6 defined the rules and ways in which, globally, through international cooperation, a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions would be dealt with

This reduction is envisaged in paragraphs 6.2, 6.4 and 6.8 both by market mechanisms linked to the negotiation of emission reduction quotas through bilateral or multilateral contracts between states (6.2) or by involving the private sector through carbon credits (6.4), and by non-market mechanisms linked to projects such as the case of reforestation.

Article 6 is structured in 9 paragraphs and 3 of these are operational: 

• Art. 6.2 defines cooperative approaches, i.e. how states can “exchange” emission contributions through carbon credit between countries in terms of ITMO (Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes), 6 2 provides a decentralized framework for bilateral or plurilateral cooperation and Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes  It also gives an international framework for trading schemes of two or more countries (for example, linking the European Union cap-and-trade program with emissions-reduction transfers from Switzerland).
• Art. 6.4 which substitutes the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Certified Emission Reduction Credits (CERs) or the so-called “carbon credits” and formalizes all the ways in which a state can contribute to its emissions reduction objectives through projects in developing countries through a centralized mechanism (the Supervisory Board) coordinated directly by the UNFCCC
• Art 6.8 which defines what are called “non-market” approaches, that is all those ways to contribute to mitigation outside the carbon market such as through nature based solutions, i.e. ecosystem solutions, reforestation and community projects or such as applying taxes to discourage emissions. This article gives a formal framework for climate cooperation between countries, where no trade is involved, being it a non-market approach, such as development aid.

Figure 2 – Article 6 at glance [5]

Focus on carbon markets  In order to talk about Article 6, an introduction on international carbon markets should be done. They work like this: countries that struggle to meet their emissions-reduction targets under their nationally determined contributions (or NDCs), or want to pursue less expensive emissions cuts, can purchase emissions reductions from other nations that have already cut their emissions more than the amount they had pledged.If the rules are structured appropriately, the result can be a win-win for everyone involved — both countries meet their climate commitments and the overachiever is financially rewarded for going above and beyond[1]

But what benefits could carbon markets offer if rules are designed well?

Carbon markets are a big deal, both in terms of potential emissions reductions and the cost

savings they can generate. Half of countries’ initial NDCs ( NDCs which should have been

updated for COP26, but most countries haven’t yet), include the use of international cooperation through carbon markets.

The potential impact is quite interesting: if all eligible CDM projects were to transition to the new mechanism and could issue carbon credits using existing CDM methodologies, they could generate up to 2.8 billion carbon credits in the period 2021 to 2030 [3].

International cooperation through carbon markets can bring additional public and private finance and catalyze emissions reductions in a country hosting the mitigation activity.

And for purchasing or acquiring countries, using carbon markets enables access to a wider pool of opportunities to reduce emissions. 

This might lead to higher ambition, given that mitigation can be made more cost-effective, which provides flexibility.

2.1 Focus on Article 6 elements 

2.1.1 ITMOs and corresponding adjustments 

Article 6.2 was intended as a framework on how transfers of mitigation outcomes between Parties can be accounted for, including conditions such as promoting sustainable development and protecting environmental integrity.

The resulting internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) can be produced from any mitigation approach agreed by cooperating Parties through bilateral or multilateral agreements.

The very essence of Art 6.2 lies in the flexibility presented to the parties to design the architecture and rules for functionality which has resulted in divergence of views and interests.

Significant progress has been achieved to provide a guidance framework in order to shape up the cooperative approaches among countries. However, human rights and (some) ambiguity in texts remain outstanding issues.

The ITMO definition, which for a long time was not seen as a desirable component of the decision, includes reductions and removals. 

Emission reductions and removals resulting from Modalities for measuring, reporting and verifying decision 14/CP.19 from 2015 onwards.

An ITMOs is defined as an authorized transfer of a mitigation outcome for use: 

a) towards an NDC; 

b) for other international purposes (undefined, but largely understood as ICAO and IMO); for other purposes as determined by the first transferring Party (largely understood for voluntary carbon markets (VM)) if the Party wishes to do so, or the standard requires it (Figure 5) .

There are some exceptions to mitigation actions like avoiding deforestation, REDD+ is not part of Art 6, and is only included in Art 5. 2 Guidance on cooperative approaches

which would have led to double counting, meaning that both the seller and buyer could use the same emission reduction to achieve

Use of non-CO2 metrics in ITMOs Before COP26 accounting must always be conducted in greenhouse gas emission metrics, expressed in tons of CO2 equivalent. However Art.6 s provide flexibility to also use other metrics, such as hectares of land afforested, countries still need to quantify the impact in a greenhouse gas emissions balance. Several critics has raised to this approach from several parties: indeed such approach which would have led to double counting, meaning that both the seller and buyer could use the same emission reduction to achieveThis concept, initially rejected, if not derided, was included in the final text. As a matter of principle, it had to be included, as it is fundamental to the concept of nationally determined in the NDC approach, which is the foundation of the Paris Agreement. If NDCs can be expressed in different metrics, it follows logically that ITMOs can also be expressed in the metric of the NDC.Being precise the definition includes reference to “metrics that are consistent with the NDC of the participating Parties” which is likely to be a limiting factor for transfers and transactions conducted in non-CO2 metrics. This could lead to the conclusion an ITMO expressed in non-CO2 cannot be transferred between Parties unless their NDC and that of the ITMO is expressed in the same metric [3].

Another part of the ITMO definition, under 2 (b), is a convoluted construct that refers to special circumstances for other uses (likely ICAO related), and results in a temporal clause when first transfer, and therefore a corresponding adjustment, takes place

In the case when an international transfer is authorized for these uses, it then requires that a corresponding adjustment be undertaken.

An Art 6.4 mechanism unit is also treated as an ITMO.

Corresponding adjustments (CA) are nothing more than double-booking entry practiced in relation to transfers of ITMOs, to ensure that there is no double counting, and that an ITMO is only used once, towards an NDC. 

Transfers that are not authorized could potentially be used for domestic purposes, results-based finance, or voluntary corporate targets. This does not represent a departure from the current situation, as mitigation outcomes can currently be transferred for VM that do not require a CA (e.g. VERRA) [3].

2.1.2 Transition to a new carbon credits market under article 6

Article 6.4 is a new crediting mechanism that many have tried to label the Sustainable Development Mechanism since it was created in Paris six years ago.
Under Article 6.4, comprehensive rules for a new carbon crediting mechanism under the supervision of a UN body were established. An advancement compared to the CDM is that the mechanism does not purely aim to offset emissions in one place by emissions in another place.

Rather, the achieved emission reductions should be shared between the seller country, the buyer country, and a small proportion of 2% that accrues to the atmosphere, referred to as overall mitigation in global emissions (OMGE). 

While this percentage is very small, the basic architecture to operationalize OMGE has been put in place and can be used to increase the rate in a future review of the rules. In addition, 5% of the carbon credits must be transferred to the Adaptation Fund [3].

In comparison to the CDM, the new mechanism also has better rules to ensure that emission reductions are robustly quantified and that the mitigation activities are additional, meaning that they would not be implemented anyway.

In contrast to the CDM, the mechanism also requires the application of robust environmental and social safeguards and establishes a grievance mechanism to appeal decisions, which however can only be

used by governments and project developers.

The decisions taken in Glasgow have also important implications for the voluntary carbon market. Most importantly, the Article 6.2 rules do not only enable countries to trade among themselves, but also require them to authorize carbon credits to be used for CORSIA (referred as „international mitigation purposes“) and allow them to authorize carbon credits for the voluntary carbon market (referred to as „other purposes“).

For any authorized carbon credits, the host country must apply corresponding adjustments. 

This means that the authorizing country no longer counts the emission reductions to achieve its own NDC and allows others to claim the emission reductions. 

The decision thus enables the voluntary carbon market to generate and use carbon units that are backed by corresponding adjustments.
Another aspect that differentiates the A6.4M from the CDM is the OMGE (overall mitigation in global emissions) which shall be operationalized through a 2% of A6.4ER being canceled at issuance. This is seen as a novelty and great progress by many Parties, which had the opportunity to do this voluntarily in the CDM, but never did.
The CDM was, and is, a mechanism to deliver CERs according to a UNFCCC defined protocol. 
How the CERs were then used by developed countries was at their discretion – could have been used to offset 100%, or only partially (e.g., 80%). This was totally at the latitude of developed countries throughout the KP period.

There is also some level of decentralization in the governance of the A6.4M, when compared to the CDM which was all top down and centralized. Parties will be able to specify certain elements such as baseline approaches and methodologies to be applied to start decentralization.

CDM activities (projects and POAs) would transition to the Art 6.4 under certain deadlines: the request for transition by project participants has to take place before 2023; the approval by the Supervisory Board has to take place by 2025 and methodologies could be used for a certain period.

The conditions for use of CERs towards NDC (only in the first NDC) were aligned with the start of the KP2 when it came to the date of registration of the project. No temporary and long-term CERs can be used towards NDC, showing some bias. No corresponding adjustment is required for pre-2020 CERs.

In the issue of CDM transition, the text needs to be considered jointly with the CMP decision on CDM. Accordingly, Parties can provisionally register new CDM projects, but for these projects to be eligible for transition to Art 6.4, they will need to meet the following conditions including using current methodologies until the end of its current crediting period or end 2025, whichever is earlier [3].

2.1.3 How Article 6 contributes to climate action

Ideally, a market-based cooperation under Article 6 will lead to an immediate climate mitigation impact as well as strengthened mid- or long-term mitigation targets.
A single cooperation activity may therefore contribute to up to three different climate change related objectives2:

▸ Contribution to climate change mitigation ambition by strengthening targets and actions;

▸ Contribution to achievement of Parties’ NDCs;

▸ Contribution to climate finance (es. Voluntary Carbon Markets).

 Article 6 may also allow the acquiring Party to dynamically enhance its mitigation ambition:  

▸ Ambition raising is related to Parties’ targets: This notion is inter alia included in Art. 4.3, which requires Parties’ NDCs to reflect the highest possible ambition.

▸ Ambition raising is related to Parties’ actions: Several paragraphs of the Paris Agreement indicate that ambition raising also relates to Parties’ actions. Art. 6.1 for instance makes reference to an increase of ambition in Parties’ mitigation and adaptation actions.

With this conceptual foundation, ambition raising can be discerned from the concept of overall mitigation.

Despite both concepts being associated with a positive contribution to the global climate, they must be kept separate. 

In the context of cooperative approaches, ambition raising is a requirement for all Parties using Art. 6, while overall mitigation is exclusively devoted to activities implemented under the Article 6.4. mechanism: Article 6.4 lists four objectives the new mechanism “shall aim” at. “To deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions” (Art 6.4 (d)) is one of them. 

3. COP 26 Achievements on Article 6 

3.1 Article 6.2 [5]

• Robust and clear rules as GHG accounting and cross border transactions through ITMOS
• Risks for double counting addressed through the Corresponding Adjustment (CA) mechanism ITMOS to be adjusted in GHG inventories
• ITMOS include both Article 6.2 and 6.4 Units including from voluntary and other carbon reduction regimes (VERA and CORSIA) Scope Expansion
• Clear linkages and calls for enhancing the Transparency Framework An International Market Mechanism governed by a Centralized “Supervisory Body” like CDM

3.2 Article 6.4[5]

• Stringent accounting rules for baseline setting, additionality below BAU aligned with long term goal
• Sets out criteria for countries to use CERs from projects registered after January 1, 2013 to meet their first NDC or first adjusted NDC, with no corresponding adjustment
• 2% cancellation of Art. 6.4 credits at cancelation as overall mitigation in global emissions (OMGE)
• 5% share of proceeds for adaptation purposes Adaptation Fund

3.3 Article 6.8 [5]

• Not final rule book but a work program adopted in Glasgow
• Voluntary cooperative actions that are not reliant on market based approaches and that do not include transactions or quid pro quo operations
• Integrated, innovative and transformational actions that have significant potential to deliver higher mitigation and adaptations ambitions
• Actions that support the implementation of NDCs of Parties hosting NMAs (hereinafter referred to as host Parties) and contribute towards the long term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement

One issue of concern is that the combination of OMGE (2%), SOP (5%), the conservative baselines and the monetary contribution under para 67 (b) might create a high barrier to entry into the Art 6.4 mechanism.

3.4 Risk and limits on the current implementation

Without the right rules in place, Article 6 could actually weaken countries’ NDCs and

increase global emissions. There are a few ways in which this could happen:

• Double-counting: While the Paris Agreement is clear that double-counting must be avoided under Article 6, the extent to which double-counting is actually avoided depends on how accounting rules are operationalized. If emissions reductions are double-counted, it will potentially result in an increase in global emissions and weaken the already inadequate NDCs.

• Additionality: The way in which Article 6 is finalized will dictate whether emissions reductions under Article 6 will be additional to what would have occurred anyway. For example, if a wind farm was already going to be built instead of a coal plant, here the carbon market didn’t offer a climate benefit. But without guidance ensuring additionality of emissions reductions, Article 6 rules could weaken NDCs.

• Failing to deliver increased ambition and progression: Article 6 can be designed in a way that either supports or hinders increased ambition – for example, by determining whether subsequent NDCs will be incentivized to increase coverage of GHGs and sectors over time, and whether transfers of emissions reductions will result in greater emissions cuts.

Furthermore regarding Share of procedures (SOP) It may be true that a SOP in Art 6.2 would not address the issue of adaptation finance, and thus make adaptation finance available commensurate with what is collected under Art 6.4, coupled with strong transparency provisions, may lead to larger and more predictable adaptation finance being made available.

Other risk to take care of : 

a) no Party oversells and have difficulty reaching its own NDC, and 

b) that most of the effort to reach one’s NDC is domestic in nature, and that reaching one’s NDC is not largely based on purchases and the use of ITMOs towards an NDC.
the use of a mitigation outcome transferred internationally and use for voluntary commitments.

So that: 

a) requires a CA by the issuing Party 

b) does not require a CA.

The situation has now been clarified (to some degree), in that the UN system will not impose additional constraints. Any additional regulation may need to be imposed at the national level, or at the standard and voluntary user level.

Transfers can take place internationally for use in VM, without Party authorization, if the Party so decides, and they will not require a CA.
The user must also accept that the mitigation outcome that it uses does not have a CA, which is likely to cause increasing reputational risks for many users.

3.5 Roadmap 2022 of Article 6

4. Article 6 and Health implications

Mitigation outcomes  Under Art.6 can also regard health sector and health co-benefits related to mitigation actions

Actually some typical mitigation actions under Art 6 can be

• Cooperation on “Green Health Facilities”: contribute to project for low carbon health infrastructure and foster cooperation between countries to achieve it 

Some examples
    – Renewable Against COVID-19 (Technical Solidarity)     
    – Global Green and Healthy Hospitals (HCWH) 

• Cooperation on Nature based solutions for healthy cities : when reforestation have mitigation outcomes under 6.2 these can have health co-benefits 
• Cooperation on Air quality determinants impact
• Adaptation projects on child and maternal health (under Share of Proceeds)

If we consider the GCHA COP26 points, we can frame them into Art 6 possible action (Table 1) in order to explore the potentials further Art.6 health implications

GCHA COP26 points on Health

1. Submit NDCs in line with the Paris Agreement by the end of 2022, as per the Glasgow Pact
   Raising ambition prevents health impacts, but real emissions reductions also offer health co-benefits.

• Failure to mitigate climate change increases the risk of catastrophic health impacts in every region of the world. As described by the IPCC, climate change has profound direct and indirect impacts on health and wellbeing, driving heatwaves and other extreme weather events, vector- and water-borne disease transmission, food and water insecurity, and negative mental health impacts.
• In addition, climate action can yield health co-benefits: emissions reductions in the energy sector improve air quality; multimodal transport systems improve air quality and support physical activity; sustainable food and agriculture systems protect and promote nutrition; nature based solutions offer mental health benefits; and resilient water and sanitation systems ensure safe drinking water and hygiene^,. 
• These co-benefits can offer high economic returns –  in China and India, costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions could be compensated with the health co-benefits alone, with partial offsetting in the United States and Western Europe.
• Net zero emissions reliant on bioenergy use with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) – if achieved – would not yield the same health co-benefits associated with real emissions reductions described here, nor the associated returns on investment.

2. Integrate health considerations into future NDCs.

• According to the Global Climate and Health Alliance Healthy NDC Scorecard, which evaluated 94 updated or enhanced NDCs by 1st October 2021, 90% of NDCs reflect health and climate linkages to some extent. Health was included largely in relation to adaptation and health impacts, followed by health co-benefits of mitigation. Few NDCs included financial provisions or economic assessments relating to health considerations, and mentions of health and climate links are often not accompanied by targets for commensurate reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. 

3. Phase out all fossil fuels and fossil fuel subsidies with attention to a just and equitable transition as a public health imperative.

• Fossil fuels are a leading driver of air pollution, while extraction and processing also threaten health. 
• Short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) released during fossil fuel extraction, transport and combustion, present particular risks for both public health and the climate. Black carbon and tropospheric ozone are health-damaging air pollutants, while methane is a precursor of the latter^,.
• Improvements in air quality alone yielded by the phase out of fossil fuels would save 3.6 million lives annually.
• Funds from fossil fuel subsidies should be rechanneled to renewable energy, or to protect vulnerable communities. 

4. Support for a sectoral approach to monitoring progress, and sharing of good practice

• The healthcare sector (including but not limited to hospitals, clinics, community health centers, social care facilities, and ambulance transportation) is a significant sector in every country and can play a key role in directly delivering mitigation (the healthcare sector contributes 4.9% of global emissions) and adaptation. At COP26, and in the months since, 55 governments have committed to sustainable, low-carbon health systems (of which 20 have committed to net zero health systems). Delivery of these commitments will be accelerated through the sharing of good practice between countries and regions. 

T

GCHA  COP26 Point	Art 6.2	Art 6.4	Art 6.8
1. Submit NDCs in line with the Paris Agreement by the end of 2022, as per the Glasgow Pact Raising ambition prevents health impacts, but real emissions reductions also offer health co-benefits.	Promote ITMO between US, EU China and BRICS that have health co-benefits Promote bioenergy cooperation project that can led to ITMOs	Involve private sector in Voluntary Markets on project on carbon neutral health facilities, energy efficiency and health co-benefit projects	Promote non-market approaches and cooperation to contribute to overallmitigation goals  Support health of the communiites
2. Integrate health considerations into future NDCs	Promote ITMOs with health co-benefits	Promote Carbon Credits related to health co-benefits	Promote non-market approaches and cooperation that can cope with lack of financial resource to provide health co-benefirs
3. Phase out all fossil fuels and fossil fuel subsidies with attention to a just and equitable transition as a public health imperative	Promote ITMOs with health co-benefits	Promote Carbon Credits related to health co-benefits	Promote collaboration and capacity building on RES , Energy Efficiency , Net-Zero Building and Climate neutral cities
4. Support for a sectoral approach to monitoring progress, and sharing of good practice	Promote capacity building ITMOs	Promote capacity building Carbon Credits	Foster non-market approaches to capacity building

Beside this overall synergies is important stress the role of the health co-benefits in mitigation actions.

Here are cited two studies of the assessment of  health co-benefits under Paris Agreement compliant policy scenarios.

Hamilton et al. [10]  modeled  the energy, food and agriculture, and transport sectors, and mortality related to risk factors of air pollution, diet, and physical activity, we analysed the health co-benefits of existing NDCs and related policies (ie, the current pathways scenario) for 2040 in nine countries around the world. 

They compared these health co-benefits with two alternative scenarios, one consistent with the goal of the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals (ie, the sustainable pathways scenario), and one in line with the sustainable pathways scenario, but also placing health as a central focus of the policies (ie, the health in all climate policies scenario[12]).

The results has been that Compared with the current pathways scenario, the sustainable pathways scenario resulted in an annual reduction of 1·18 million air pollution-related deaths, 5·86 million diet-related deaths, and 1·15 million deaths due to physical inactivity, across the nine countries, by 2040. 

Adopting the more ambitious health in all climate policies scenario would result in a further reduction of 462 000 annual deaths attributable to air pollution, 572 000 annual deaths attributable to diet, and 943 000 annual deaths attributable to physical inactivity. These benefits were attributable to the mitigation of direct greenhouse gas emissions and the commensurate actions that reduce exposure to harmful pollutants, as well as improved diets and safe physical activity.

Markandya et al [11] analyzed the extent to which health co-benefits would compensate the mitigation cost of achieving the targets of the Paris climate agreement (2°C and 1·5°C) under different scenarios in which the emissions abatement effort is shared between countries in accordance with three established equity criteria (cooperative approaches). 

Their finding has been that health co-benefits substantially outweighed the policy cost of achieving the target for all of the scenarios analyzed. I

n some of the mitigation strategies, the median co-benefits were double the median costs at a global level. The ratio of health co-benefit to mitigation cost ranged from 1·4 to 2·45, depending on the scenario. At the regional level, the costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions could be compensated with the health co-benefits alone for China and India, whereas the proportion the co-benefits covered varied but could be substantial in the European Union (7–84%) and USA (10–41%), respectively.
Finally, the extra effort of trying to pursue the 1·5°C target instead of the 2°C target would generate a substantial net benefit in India (US$3·28–8·4 trillion) and China ($0·27–2·31 trillion), although this positive result was not seen in the other regions. 

This promising data are giving a base to promote multilateralism and cooperative approaches as in Paris Agreement and Article 6.

References

1. What You Need to Know About Article 6 of the Paris Agreement
   https://www.wri.org/blog/2019/12/article-6-paris-agreement-what-you-need-to-know
2. Article 6 Rule Book
   https://ercst.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/20211122-COP26-Art6-final.pdf 
3. COP26 in Glasgow delivered rules for international carbon markets – how good or bad are they?
   https://blog.oeko.de/glasgow-delivered-rules-for-international-carbon-markets-how-good-or-bad-are-they-cop26/ 
4. The voluntary carbon Markets https://epub.wupperinst.org/frontdoor/deliver/index/docId/7396/file/7396_Carbon_Market.pdf
5. SIDE EVENT SB56 – Dialogues on capacity building needs for the implementation of Article 6 
6. Michaelowa, A., Friedmann, V., Hoch, S., Honegger, M., Hans, F., & Ci-Dev Carbon Initiative. (2016). The impact of INDCs, NAMAs and LEDS on Ci-Dev operations and programs.
7. Chapter 3: How does the voluntary carbon market link to the Paris Agreement and Article 6?

Chapter 3: How does the voluntary carbon market link to the Paris Agreement and Article 6?

8. https://hubzineitalia.com/2021/11/25/articolo-6-il-numero-imperfetto/ 
9. https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-glasgow-climate-pact/cop26-outcomes-market-mechanisms-and-non-market-approaches-article-6
10. Hamilton, I., Kennard, H., McGushin, A., Höglund-Isaksson, L., Kiesewetter, G., Lott, M., … & Watts, N. (2021). The public health implications of the Paris Agreement: a modelling study. The Lancet Planetary Health, 5(2), e74-e83
11. Markandya, A., Sampedro, J., Smith, S. J., Van Dingenen, R., Pizarro-Irizar, C., Arto, I., & González-Eguino, M. (2018). Health co-benefits from air pollution and mitigation costs of the Paris Agreement: a modelling study. The Lancet Planetary Health, 2(3), e126-e133.
12. Health in all Policies https://www.who.int/activities/promoting-health-in-all-policies-and-intersectoral-action-capacities

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